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The Issue Presented
Domestic courts frequently apply foreign law. For example, the forum’s choice-of-law rules may
require a court to apply foreign law, or a party may expressly base a claim or defense on foreign
law. Private international law (or “conflict of laws”) provides principles governing many aspects
of how courts should identify and interpret foreign law.1
In the U.S. federal courts, the applicable rule is Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides, in relevant part: “In determining foreign law, the court may consider
any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination must be treated as a
ruling on a question of law.”2
However, those principles do not provide clear guidance on how heavily a court should weigh a
foreign government’s own statements about the meaning of its law.3 This was the issue presented
in Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.4
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1 See generally PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 12.15-12.19, at 550-561 (6th ed. 2018); TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW: DYNAMICS TOWARDS
CONVERGENCE? (Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017); Maarit Jäntera-Jareborg, Foreign Law in National Courts—A
Comparative Perspective, 304 Recueil des cours 281 (2003).
2 F.R.C.P. 44.1. See generally Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign
Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1967).
3 See Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd 138 S.Ct. 1865, 1873 (“Rule 44.1
does
notgovernment….Nor
address the weightdoes
a federal
courtrule
determining
foreign law should give to the views presented by the
foreign
any other
or statute.”).
4 See id. at 1869 (2018) (“When foreign law is relevant to a case instituted in a federal court, and the foreign
government whose law is in contention submits an official statement on the meaning and interpretation of its
domestic law, may the federal court look beyond that official statement?”). For a prior discussion of this case, see
Kristen E. Eichensehr, International Decision, 113 AM. J. INT’L. L. 116 (2019).
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The Animal Science Litigation
In Animal Science, petitioners alleged that respondents conspired to fix the price of vitamin C
exports to the United States, in violation of U.S. antitrust law. Respondents raised various
defenses based on the assertion that their price-fixing was required by Chinese law. 5 In support
of the respondents, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China filed statements
asserting that the alleged conspiracy was instead “a regulatory pricing regime mandated by the
government of China.”6 The petitioners challenged this position, noting that the Ministry
identified no written law expressly requiring respondents to fix vitamin C export prices, and that
China had previously made a statement to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that it “gave up
export administration of…vitamin C” in 2002.7
In rejecting respondents’ argument and holding that Chinese law did not require them to fix
prices, the District Court provided one possible answer to the question of foreign government
statements regarding the meaning of foreign law: such statements are “entitled to substantial
deference, but will not be taken as conclusive evidence….” 8
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, offering
an alternative rule: “[W]hen a foreign government, acting through counsel or otherwise, directly
participates in U.S. court proceedings by providing a sworn evidentiary proffer regarding the
construction and effect of its laws and regulations, which is reasonable under the circumstances
presented, a U.S. court is bound to defer to those statements.”9
An amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court proposed a third approach: “U.S. courts should
give respectful consideration to a foreign government’s statements about its law. But as a matter
of law, a foreign government’s statements cannot be binding on U.S. courts. Instead, U.S. courts
should accurately and independently determine the meaning of foreign law taking into account
not only the foreign government’s own statements, but also other relevant information about that
law.”10
The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s decision, unanimously holding that “[a] federal
court should accord respectful consideration to a foreign government’s submission, but is not
bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign government’s statements.” 11
These included defenses based on the act of state doctrine, the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, and the
principles of international comity. Id. at 1870.
6 138 S.Ct. at 1870.
7 Id. at 1871.
8 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 784 F.Supp.2d 546, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying respondents’ motion to
dismiss). The District Court later denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment, “declin[ing] to defer to the
Chinese government’s statements to the court regarding Chinese law” and holding that “[t]he Chinese law relied
upon by [respondents] did not compel their illegal conduct.” 810 F.Supp.2d 522, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
9 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d. Cir. 2016).
10 Brief, supra note *, at 36-39. The author of this Introductory Note was one of the lead co-authors of this brief,
along with Zachary D. Clopton and Neil A.F. Popović.
11 138 S.Ct. at 1869. The Court noted that “[t]he correct interpretation of Chinese law” was not before it and that it
took no position on that question. Id. at 1875.
5
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What, then, does it mean to give “respectful consideration” to foreign government statements?
The Supreme Court affirmed that “a federal court should carefully consider a foreign state’s
views about the meaning of its own laws.”12 However, it emphasized that “the appropriate
weight in each case will depend upon the circumstances,” and it explained that “[r]elevant
considerations include the statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and
purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and authority of the entity or
official offering the statement; and the statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s
past positions.”13 The Court also identified warning signs for courts to be alert to, noting that
“[w]hen a foreign government makes conflicting statements…or…offers an account in the
context of litigation, there may be cause for caution in evaluating the foreign government’s
submission.”14
Assessment and Implications
The Supreme Court’s approach is a sensible one. Unlike the Second Circuit’s “bound to defer”
rule, the “respectful consideration” standard does not prevent U.S. federal courts from
“consider[ing] any relevant material or source” when determining foreign law, as Rule 44.1
expressly authorizes them to do. 15 Respectful consideration is also consistent with the principle
of accuracy in the determination of foreign law, which implies that courts must consider
information about foreign law based on how reliable and persuasive the information is,16 and
with the principle that U.S. courts should determine law—including foreign law—
independently.17
The “respectful consideration” standard is also consistent with the principal international treaties
on the interpretation of foreign law:18 the European Convention on Information on Foreign
Law19 and the Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law.20 Both
treaties allow a court to request information about foreign law from a designated foreign
government official. But even when there is a formal request and foreign government reply, the
reply is not binding on the court.21 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Animal Science opinion may
be informative for the courts of other countries when ascertaining the content and meaning of
foreign law.
Although it rejected the Second Circuit’s bound-to-defer rule, the Supreme Court’s opinion does
not imply that statements by foreign governments about foreign law are unimportant. To the
Id. at 1873.
Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.; Brief, supra note *, at 5-10.
16 Id. at 11-16.
17 Id. at 16-18.
18 See 138 S.Ct. 1875; Brief, supra note *, at 23-25.
19 European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, June 7, 1968, 720 U.N.T.S. 154.
20 Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, May 8, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 111.
21 See European Convention, art. 8 (“The information given in the reply shall not bind the judicial authority from
which the request emanated.”); Inter-American Convention, art. 6 (“[Parties] shall not be required to apply the law,
or cause it to be applied, in accordance with the content of the reply received.”).
12
13
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contrary, one would expect that courts applying the respectful consideration standard will in
many cases rely heavily a such statements.22 Ordinarily, for example, a U.S. court applying the
respectful consideration standard would likely follow an independent foreign court’s
authoritative interpretation of its own law in an unrelated case. Courts faced with issues of
foreign law should welcome—and in some cases actively seek—information from a foreign state
about its law.23 The contribution of the Animal Science decision is not to diminish the importance
of foreign government statements about foreign law, but rather to clarify that a court is not
required to treat those statements as conclusive and to provide factors to consider when
determining how much weight to give to those statements.

Cf. 138 S.Ct. at 1875 (referring favorably to principle that “a government’s expressed view of its own law is
ordinarily entitled to substantial weight but not conclusive weight”).
23 Brief, supra note *, at 37.
22
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